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SPENDING LIMITS AND THE SQUANDERING
OF CANDIDATES' TIME
Vincent Blast
Let me say first what an honor it is to participate in a conference intended to · pay tribute to Judge Trager. Too often former
deans do not receive credit commensurate with their labors and
accomplishments. This gathering strikes me as a particularly fitting
way to honor a man who has contributed a great deal to legal
education.
Today I begin with a narrow agenda, a single idea, but an
extravagant ambition. My narrow agenda is that I wish to address
only the topic of campaign spending limits, and only the issue of
their constitutionality in the face of First Amendment objections.
The policy questions regarding whether spending limits are
equitable, efficacious, and/or enforceable are deeply difficult and
interesting but beyond my ken on this occasion.
My single idea is that spending limits are best justified on the
ground that they protect candidates for office from having to devote
an inordinate amount of their time to the task of raising money,
time that would be far better spent in a variety of endeavors that
directly serve the constitutionally ordained process of political
representation.
My extravagant ambition is to persuade you that this "candidate
time-protection" rationale for spending limits has the potential to
radically transform the First Amendment calculus such that the
Supreme Court could now uphold spending limits without repudiating any of the reasoning it used twenty-one years ago in Buckley
v. Valeo 1 to strike them down.

• Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia University School
of Law.
1
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Why, among the multifarious proposals for campaign finance
reform, am I interested primarily in spending limits? It is not
because I am offended by the sheer amount of political advertising
on the airwaves in the weeks preceding an election. Nor do I favor
spending limits because I think they would lead to more substantive
messages or reduce the incidence of smear tactics; I doubt that
either of these effects would ensue were candidates constrained by
spending limits. My chief concern is with the way the very process
of representation, and indeed the identity of the representatives
themselves, has come to be dominated by the quest for contributions. And if the frenetic competition for campaign dollars is at the
heart of the problem, no reform will succeed that leaves candidates
free to spend all the money they can raise. If they can spend it,
they will try to raise it, whatever the cost in time or distraction, if
only for insurance against a feared challenge or difficulty down the
road.
It is important to realize that this phenomenon of all-consuming
fundraising is relatively recent, at least as a widespread phenomenon, indeed more recent than Buckley itself. 2 One might even say
that a large part of the problem was caused by Buckley. Recall that
the decision in Buckley invalidated spending limits while upholding
rather severe contribution limits. 3 As a result, candidates needed as
much money as ever to keep up with the competition but had to get
that money in small units, inevitably in a more time-consuming
manner. As the art of getting elected came to depend more and
more on expensive electoral merchandising techniques-for
example, tracking polls, focus groups, repetitive spot advertisements
and demographically targeted direct mail-the quest for money
quickened. 4
The fact that the dimensions of the problem are new represents
a constitutional opportunity. For Buckley was decided in a truly
different electoral era. In 1976 the proponents of spending limits all
but ignored the time-protection rationale. The Court's opinion

2

See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS,
AND POLITICAL REFORM 54 (1992).
3

4

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29, 35-36, 38, 54-58.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 78-81.
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invalidating the limits did not discuss how a ceiling on spending
might reduce the drain of fundraising. Rather, three other rationales
were addressed and found wanting.
First, spending limits were defended on the ground that
candidates, in need of ever escalating amounts of money, would be
tempted to find ways to evade the low contribution limits. The
Court found this claim insufficient because the link between
spending limits and enforcement of the contribution limits seemed
too attenuated to the Justices. 5
Second, spending limits were defended as a means of opening
up the opportunity to run for office to persons who lack either
personal wealth or fundraising skills and connections. Fair play for
impecunious candidates was the goal. The Court concluded that
spending limits might facilitate certain candidacies but might also
discourage others, particularly challenges that rely on heavy
spending to overcome the advantages enjoyed by an incumbent
already well known to the electorate. 6 The net effect was thus
mixed and uncertain, and not a sufficient basis for regulating
speech.
Third, spending limits were presented as a way to contain
wasteful, excessive spending on campaigns. The Court understandably bristled at this suggestion, stating categorically that it is not
the business of government to decide that Americans are hearing
too much speech. 7
It is significant that the Court never addressed the timeprotection rationale for spending limits. 8 Not only is that rationale
unburdened by adverse precedent and responsive to a problem that
has grown exponentially since Buckley was decided, but the time-

5

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-56.
Id. at 56-57.
1
Id. at 57.
8
In his dissent in Buckley, Justice White mentioned in passing the problem
of time devoted to fundraising, see id. at 265, but the majority never considered
the point. Nor did the briefs submitted to the Court in defense of spending limits
devote any significant space to the time protection rationale. See Vincent Blasi,
Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-raising: Why Campaign Spending
Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 CoLUM L. REV. 1281,
1285-86 n. 15 (1994).
6
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protection rationale also depends on a logic of harm that places it
in a different and more favorable category, as a matter of First
Amendment jurisprudence, than the rationales that failed in
Buckley. Please let me explain.
As traditionally interpreted, the First Amendment erects a heavy
presumption against restrictions on speech designed to eliminate or
diminish the communicative impact of the message. 9 In this view,
governments ordinarily cannot be trusted to evaluate messages.
Even if they could be, the better, non-paternalistic way to control
the undoubted harm that speech can do is to require audiences to
do the heavy lifting of intellectual and moral evaluation. 10 This is
particularly so when the partisan political advantage of the
lawmakers or enforcement officials is likely to inform the assessment of speech-induced harm. When the Buckley Court held that
government lacks the authority to try to balance electoral debate or
limit excessive campaign advertising, the Justices drew heavily on
this tradition of anti-paternalism.
The candidate time-protection rationale for spending limits does
not rest on any kind of supposition regarding the communicative
impact of the speech that is being regulated. Rather, the claim of
harm concerns the process of generating the speech, to wit the
harm to representation that occurs when candidates must spend so
much of their time raising money. There is no distrust of audiences
implicit in the limiting of spending for this purpose; the First
Amendment's powerful anti-paternalism principle is not implicated.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality that stalks regulations
designed to control the communicative impact of speech does .not
properly come into play when the concern is the harms that are
caused by the activities that generate the speech in question. Nonobscene child pornography, for example, can be regulated on the
basis of the risks to child actors that are endemic to the production
9

For a clear and comprehensive explanation of this principle see Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189 (1983).
10
Justice Brandeis said it best: "[T]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones." Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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process, quite apart from any hrum the finished product may do to
viewers of such pornography. 11 Civil servants can be prohibited
from certain forms of participation in election campaigns so as to
prevent supervisors from coercing such participation or retaliating
against workers who refuse to compromise their political independence.12 Sanctions against illegal or unethical journalistic practices, such as breaching an explicit promise of confidentiality made
to a source, can be enforced even if valuable news stories are lost
or deterred as a result. 13
These instances of regulating speech so as to prevent harms
endemic to the process of generating the message do not raise the
same kinds of concerns under the First Amendment as are presented by regulatory efforts aimed at the communicative impact of
speech. Limits on campaign spending that are designed to protect
the time of candidates fall into this category of laws that raise some
degree of First Amendment concern, to be sure, but not the heavy
presumption of unconstitutionality that properly governs efforts to
control the communicative impact of speech. In this respect, the
logic of Buckley, the logic of the anti-paternalism principle that lies
at the core of the First Amendment tradition, is simply inapplicable.
By no means does this basic conceptual point complete the
argument that is necessary to establish that campaign spending
limits can be reconciled with the First Amendment. Many additional considerations need be taken into account, such as whether
spending limits would really alter how candidates allocate their
time and whether it is permissible under the First Amendment to
limit the spending of candidates when other "independent" speakers
with ideas relating to the election are not subject to spending
limits. 14 Moreover, the single point I have developed here does
not, by any stretch, demonstrate that spending limits can be
justified as a matter of sound public policy quite apart from their
consistency with fundamental First Amendment principles. In the
11

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982).
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 566 (1973).
13
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-71 (1991).
14
I have canvassed some of those considerations in Blasi, supra note 8, at
1309-14, 1316-23.
12
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brief time appropriate to this occasion, I have attempted only to
convince you that the time-protection rationale goes far to vitiate
the force of the Buckley precedent. That, as I said at the outset, is
a narrow point but, given the stakes for our republican form of
government, a profoundly important one.

